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Social Purpose Corporations:  
The Next Targets for Greenwashing Practices and 
Crowdfunding Scams 
Tina H. Ho* 
With an increased focus on corporate social responsibility,1 various states 
have recently created a for-profit corporate entity that considers both social 
and shareholders’ interests.2 These for-profit corporations, such as benefit 
corporations, balance both shareholders’ profits and public interests.3 In 
addition to corporations’ traditional purposes of profit maximization, these 
for-profit corporations also strive to create public benefit to the community 
and environment or even to the corporations’ employees, supply chain, and 
customers.4 
Washington State has followed this trend and created a for-profit 
business entity known as a “social purpose corporation,” emphasizing that 
the requirements and regulations related to this entity should be flexible in 
legislating corporate behavior.5 Washington’s social purpose corporation 
statute was intended to provide more flexibility than was afforded by the 
                                                                                                                              
* Tina Ho is a 2015 JD Candidate at Seattle University School of Law. She would like to 
thank the Seattle Journal for Social Justice for giving her the opportunity to share her 
perspectives and for supporting her through the entire writing process. She would also 
like to thank faculty mentors, family, and friends for their support.  
1 Archie B. Carroll & Kareem M. Shabana, The Business Case for Corporate Social 
Responsibility: A Review of Concepts, Research, and Practice, 12 INT’L J. OF MGMT. 
REVS. 85, 85 (2010). 
2 H.R. 2239, 62nd Cong. (Wash. 2012). 




5 John Reed & Anne Wellman Lewis, The Social Purpose Corporation, STARTUP LAW 
BLOG (May 8, 2012), http://www.startuplawblog.com/2012/05/08/social-purpose-
corporation/. 
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comparable benefit corporation statutes.6 However, by allowing such 
flexibility, fraudsters can utilize social purpose corporations for 
greenwashing practices and crowdfunding scams. This article will discuss 
the rise of greenwashing and crowdfunding scams, the reasons why social 
purpose corporations are the next targets for these scams, and what 
Washington State’s legislature can do to protect legitimate social purpose 
corporations that benefit society’s welfare and to deter deceptive practices 
and potential scams. The article will focus on Washington’s social purpose 
corporation legislation because Washington was the first state to create a 
social purpose corporation.7 However, the article recognizes that the 
analysis and prescribed solutions in this article can be applied to other states 
that have pending or recently passed social purpose corporation legislation.8 
INTRODUCTION 
Both “environmentally friendly” and “crowdfunding” are terms that have 
gained tremendous attention in the general population in the last few years. 
Specifically, environmental marketing has been growing exponentially 
since the 1990s and there has been a drastic jump in the quantity of products 
that claim to be environmentally friendly.9 However in 2010, “[o]ne green 
marketing firm examined more than 12,000 different green advertising 
                                                                                                                              
6 Id. 
7 Social Purpose Corporation, SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos.wa.gov/corps/ 
SocialPurposeCorporation.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). 
8 Only one other state, Florida, had adopted a social purpose corporation entity in July 
2014. The one difference between the Washington and Florida legislation is that Florida 
created both the benefit corporation and the social purpose corporation whereas 
Washington only offers the social purpose corporation in lieu of a benefit corporation 
entity. See, e.g., Stuart R. Cohn & Stuart D. Ames, Now It’s Easier Being Green: 
Florida’s New Benefit and Social Purpose Corporations, 88 THE FLA B.J. 38, 38 (2014), 
available at http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNJournal01.nsf/8c9f13012b9673 
6985256aa900624829/c655f4f9d7d009b585257d7e004bcb18!OpenDocument. 
9 Nick Feinstein, Note: Learning from Past Mistakes: Future Regulation to Prevent 
Greenwashing, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 229, 232 (2013). 
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claims and concluded that 95 percent were overly vague or unsupported.”10 
Another report found that “of over 1,000 self-declared ‘green’ products 
reviewed, all but one engaged in some form of greenwash.”11 Greenwashing 
refers to companies making “deceptive, misleading, and false” 
environmental claims.12 
Crowdfunding has also gained significant visibility in the past several 
years. Although crowdfunding has the potential to raise much-needed 
capital for small businesses and entrepreneurs, it also creates a great 
potential for scams. A well-known crowdfunding scam on Kickstarter is 
“Kobe Red.”13 The project by Magnus Fun, Inc., claimed to be raising 
money for a Kobe beef-based jerky business, made with 100 percent 
organic feed- and beer-fed Japanese cows.14 In less than four weeks, 
Magnus Fun, Inc., raised more than $120,000 from 3,252 backers, almost 
50 times its initial goal of $2,437.15 Luckily, just hours before the month-
long fundraising efforts were to end and the funds were to be released to 
Magnus Fun, Inc., Kickstarter suspended the fundraising campaign when it 
was discovered that the project was a scam.16 Among other suspicious 
details, Magnus Fun, Inc.’s promises and taste testimonials displayed on its 
Kickstarter website proved to be fake and inaccurate.17 Further information 
regarding this scam is mentioned in Part IV, Section B of this article. 
Greenwashing practices have gone rampant and there are already 
instances of crowdfunding scams nationwide and globally. This article will 
                                                                                                                              
10 David J. Gilles & Matthew T. Kemp, Greenwash: Overselling a Product’s 
‘Greenness’, 85 WIS. LAW. 1, 4 (2012). 
11 Eric L. Lane, Consumer Protection in the Eco-Mark Era: A Preliminary Survey and 
Assessment of Anti-Greenwashing Activity and Eco-Mark Enforcement, 9 J. MARSHALL 
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 742, 746 (2010). 
12 Hill v. Roll Int’l Corp., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 109, 111 (Cal.Ct.App. 2011). 
13 Eric Larson, How the ‘Biggest Scam in Kickstarter History’ Almost Worked, 
MASHABLE (Jun. 21, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/06/21/kickstarter-scam/. 
14 Id. 
15 Id.    
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
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argue, however, that the potential for both greenwashing practices and 
reward crowdfunding scams has increased with the creation of social 
purpose corporations in Washington. Because Washington’s social purpose 
corporations have flexible filing requirements and few barriers to 
incorporation, they will likely be the next targets for these scams. Fraudsters 
may easily set up social purpose corporations with a broadly stated green or 
social purpose and prey on novice green or social investors. Also, through 
crowdfunding, fraudsters now have another vehicle for falsely obtaining 
money that they would normally be unable to obtain from sophisticated 
investors. In general, sophisticated investors are more likely to have the 
financial acumen and/or awareness to discover a scam.18 Crowdfunding 
portals such as Kickstarter target and cater to novice investors but provide 
little to no protection for these investors. Kickstarter states on its website 
“Kickstarter does not guarantee projects or investigate a creator’s ability to 
complete their project. On Kickstarter, backers (you!) ultimately decide the 
validity and worthiness of a project by whether they decide to fund it.”19 
Part I of this article will introduce the concept of greenwashing and 
crowdfunding. Part II will provide a background on social purpose 
corporations, including their legislative history in Washington State. Part III 
will outline the reasons why social purpose corporations will most likely be 
the next targets for greenwashing and crowdfunding scams. Finally, Part IV 
will offer multiple legislative solutions to deter both types of fraud. 
                                                                                                                              
18 Thomas G. James, Far from the Maddening Crowd: Does the Jobs Act Provide 
Meaningful Redress to Small Investors for Securities Fraud in Connection with 
Crowdfunding Offerings?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1767, 1769 (2013). 
19 Kickstarter Basics, KICKSTARTER FAQ, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/kick 
starter%20basics (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). 
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PART I: INTRODUCTION TO GREENWASHING AND CROWDFUNDING 
A. Greenwashing 
Defined by one source as “disinformation disseminated by an 
organization so as to present an environmentally responsible public 
image,”20 greenwashing is the practice of making one’s product seem more 
environmentally friendly than it actually is.21 Another source defines 
greenwashing as companies making “deceptive, misleading, and false” 
environmental claims.22 
Greenwashing occurs for a number of reasons, but it is mostly driven by 
profits.23 Becoming environmentally friendly, or at least appearing 
environmentally friendly, looks good for a company’s bottom line.24 Both 
consumer and investor choices prompt greenwashing. Generally, consumers 
and investors are more willing to buy and invest in products if they are 
environmentally friendly and many companies develop goodwill for 
developing a “green product.”25 Additionally, many consumers are willing 
to pay extra for environmentally friendly products. 
A combination of increased attention to environmental issues and 
consumers who are willing to alter their purchasing habits has prompted an 
increase in environmental marketing.26 Surveys reveal a “growing segment 
of consumers who either reward or intend to reward firms that address 
environmental concerns in their business and marketing practices and who 
punish firms that appear to ignore the environmental imperatives.”27  
                                                                                                                              
20 Jacob Vos, Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Greenwashing in Corporate America, 
23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 673, 674 (2009). 
21 Koh v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., No. C-09-00927 RMW, 2010 WL 94265 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 6, 2010). 
22 Hill, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 111. 
23 Vos, supra note 20, at 680. 
24 Id. at 674. 
25 Id. 
26 Feinstein, supra note 9, at 231. 
27 Ajay Menon & Anil Menon, Environmental Marketing Strategy: The Emergence of 
Corporate Environmentalism as Market Strategy, 61 J. MARKETING  51, 52 (1997). 
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Many times, the first company that makes steps towards being 
environmentally friendly can improve its market share through 
differentiation.28 Once high-profile companies begin committing to certain 
environmentally friendly policies, such as McDonald’s switching from 
foam containers to paper wrapping,29 other companies follow suit, using the 
high-profile companies’ actions as benchmarks for environmentally friendly 
policies.30 
The fear of bad publicity also creates an incentive for companies to 
advertise green practices. Pressures from external monitoring organizations 
like watchdog groups exert public pressure on companies to commit to 
protecting the environment.31 In 2009, Kimberly-Clark gained negative 
public attention for cutting down 200-year-old forests to produce its 
products such as Kleenex tissues, while simultaneously promoting the 
company’s efforts to reduce carbon emissions.32 Greenpeace proceeded to 
launch an aggressive activist campaign against Kimberly-Clark.33 In 
response, Kimberly-Clark released new environmental policies with the end 
goal of ensuring that 100 percent of the fiber used in its products will be 
from environmentally responsible sources.34 
Additionally, there is a rise in green investors, who are specifically 
looking to invest in companies that are green.35 Currently, green investors 
                                                                                                                              
28 Catherine A. Ramus & Ivan Montiel, When are Corporate Environmental Policies a 
Form of Greenwashing?, 44 BUS. & SOC’Y 377, 388 (2005). 
29 Feinstein, supra note 9, at 232. 
30 Ramus & Montiel, supra note 28, at 386. 
31 Id. 
32 Feinstein, supra note 9, at 234. 
33 Kimberly-Clark and Greenpeace Agree to Historic Measures to Protect Forests, 
KLEENCUT WIPING AWAY ANCIENT FORESTS, http://www.kleercut.net/en/ (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2015). 
34 KIMBERLY-CLARK, Fiber Procurement, at 4 (2009), available at http://www.cms.kim 
Berly-clark.com/umbracoimages/UmbracoFileMedia/Fiber%20Procurement%20Policy 
_umbracoFile.pdf. 
35 Vos, supra note 20, at 682. 
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control about 10 percent of the national market.36 Business scholars have 
recognized that “[b]oth the analytic comparative statics and the numerical 
examples indicate that the number of green investors in an economy does 
affect the proportion of acceptable, unacceptable, and reformed firms in the 
economy and the costs of capital of those firms.”37 For instance, when green 
investors boycott certain companies, fewer investors hold the stock of these 
firms, causing the share prices to fall.38 As described in one article, “[t]he 
larger the market share controlled by green investors, the more expensive it 
will be to be labeled a polluter.”39 
Despite their best intentions, many green investors fall victim to 
greenwashing practices.40 Green investors believe they are investing in 
corporations that have an honorable social or environmental purpose, but 
that is often not the case.41 According to Jacob Vos, “[w]ithout verifiable 
information it is difficult for investors to make informed decisions about 
environmentally responsible practices and companies.”42 The investors are 
only able to rely on corporate representations to the public, which are often 
major mischaracterizations of corporations’ actual activities.43 With nothing 
to rely on besides the corporations’ own information, green investors end up 
investing in many corporations with so-called environmental practices that 
may not actually be helpful to the environment.44 However, many 
corporations recognize this scenario as an opportunity to gain more 
                                                                                                                              
36 Id. 
37 Robert Heinkel, Alan Kraus & Josef Zechner, The Effect of Green Investment on 
Corporate Behavior, 36 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 431, 444 (2001). 
38 Id. at 432. 
39 Vos, supra note 20, at 682. 
40 William S. Laufer, Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing, 43 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 253, 251, 254–55 (2003). 
41 Id. 
42 Vos, supra note 20, at 683. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
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investors, and “[m]any corporations creatively manage their environmental 
reputations for this very reason.”45 
The issue with greenwashing is that “[i]f a company can reap the benefits 
of a green reputation such as increased customer base or goodwill 
reputation without actually investing the time or money to substantially 
change its practices, the company is able to reap all of the benefits without 
any of the associated costs.”46 Greenwashing “has become so rampant” that 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued standards known as “Green 
Guides”47 pursuant to its authority to enforce Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (FTC Act), which generally prohibits deceptive-
advertising practices.48 Although not legally binding, the Green Guides 
“reflect the FTC’s approach to evaluating environmental marketing claims, 
and courts generally view them as persuasive authority.”49 However, even 
with the Green Guides, greenwashing practices are still a common practice 
within many industries. 
B. Crowdfunding 
In addition to greenwashing practices becoming rampant, crowdfunding, 
as an internet-based fundraising model, has gained popularity in the last 
several years. Crowdfunding is designed for “startups—businesses still in 
their infancy.”50 In the absence of available start-up capital, small 
businesses and entrepreneurs have started looking at crowdfunding as a 
low-cost means of locating potential investors and capital.51 
                                                                                                                              
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 681. 
47 Hill, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 111. 
48 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2005). 
49 Gilles & Kemp, supra note 10, at 5. 
50 David Mashburn, Comment: The Anti-Crowd Pleaser: Fixing the Crowdfund Act’s 
Hidden Risks and Inadequate Remedies, 63 EMORY L.J. 127, 157 (2013). 
51 James, supra note 18, at 1772. 
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Crowdfunding is raising capital online from many investors, the “crowd,” 
who each contribute small amounts of money to a single venture.52 The 
“crowd” has grown at an incredible rate due to the internet and the 
popularity of e-commerce platforms.53 A recent report by Massolution 
stated that contributors across the world pledged $2.7 billion in more than a 
million online campaigns in 2012, an 81 percent increase from 2011.54 
Gofundme, a crowdfunding site with the current highest internet traffic, has 
raised over $710 million for personal fundraisers.55 
Crowdfunding is generally facilitated through peer-to-peer lending 
websites, which are commonly known as funding portals.56 These websites 
provide a platform for individuals to invest funds, both domestically and 
overseas.57 Although there are several models of crowdfunding including 
donation, lending, reward, pre-purchase, and equity/securities, this article 
will mainly focus on reward crowdfunding.58 Reward crowdfunding portals, 
are gaining popularity rapidly and there is no specific legislation regarding 
the amount of capital that businesses and entrepreneurs may fundraise 
through reward crowdfunding.59 This article will also discuss 
                                                                                                                              
52 Andrew A. Schwartz, ROUNDTABLE: Keep it Light, Chairman White: SEC 
Rulemaking Under the CROWDFUND Act, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 43, 44 (2013). 
53 Andrew C. Fink, Protecting the Crowd and Raising Capital Through the 
CROWDFUND Act, 90 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 3 (2012). 
54 Bettina Eckerle, There Is More to Crowdfunding than the JOBS Act, 
CROWDSOURCING.ORG, May 13, 2013, http://www.crowdsourcing.org/blog/there-is-
more-to-crowdfunding-than-the-jobs-act/29050. 
55 CROWDFUNDING FOR EVERYONE, http://www.gofundme.com/ (last visited Mar. 2, 
2015). 
56 D. Scott Freed, Crowdfunding as a Platform for Raising Small Business Capital, 45 
MD. B.J. 12, 13 (2012). 
57 Id. 
58 Reward crowdfunding is a type of crowdfunding where individuals receive a reward 
for contributing funds to a company. A more detailed explanation of reward 
crowdfunding is provided below.  
59 Although there are no restrictions on the amount of money a business or entrepreneur 
may raise through donation crowdfunding, there is an understanding that the donors do 
not expect to see any of their initial investment returned in social or public benefits. 
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equity/security crowdfunding as a basis for the suggested additional 
protections on reward crowdfund investors. 
In donation crowdfunding, investors donate money to a cause without 
expecting to receive anything in return other than a possible tax benefit or 
satisfaction.60 This type of crowdfunding can raise large amounts of capital. 
For instance, President Barack Obama’s campaign used crowdfunding to 
raise about “$1 million a day, all online, with more than a million sub-
$1,000 contributions” to raise $75 million.61 Because investors in donation 
crowdfunding do not expect a return, no need for increased protection for 
investors exists, which is why an analysis relating specifically to donation 
crowdfunding has been omitted. 
Lending crowdfunding occurs when “crowdfunders” make loans through 
websites, with or without interest, and expect to receive their principal 
amount back in the future.62 Interest-bearing loans are securities subject to 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations and therefore must 
be registered.63 One scholar estimated that peer-to-peer lending alone has 
raised an estimated $1 billion in funding for small businesses and will likely 
raise in excess of $5 billion by the end of 2013.64 Because SEC regulations 
provide strict registration requirements and damage remedies, no immediate 
need for increased investor protection exists, which is why an analysis 
relating specifically to lending crowdfunding has been omitted. 
In reward crowdfunding, investors receive rewards or products in return 
for their investment.65 Rewards are tangible benefits that cannot be 
                                                                                                                              
60 John S. (Jack) Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg, 
Saverin, and Venture Capitalists’ Dilution of the Crowd, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 
583, 588 (2013). 
61 Daniel M. Satorius & Stu Pollard, Crowd Funding: What Independent Producers 
Should Know About the Legal Pitfalls, 28 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 15, 16 (2010). 
62 Wroldsen, supra note 60, at 588–89. 
63 Id. at 589. 
64 James, supra note 18, at 1772. 
65 Schwartz, supra note 52, at 47. 
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security.66 For example, through reward crowdfunding, a business or 
entrepreneur can give a thank you note as a tangible benefit for their 
investment. 
Reward crowdfunding through crowdfunding portal websites such as 
Kickstarter and IndieGoGo has gained popularity since 2009, growing into 
a $1.5 billion market in just a couple of years.67 In 2013 alone, three million 
people pledged $480 million to Kickstarter projects, which is about 
$1,315,520 pledged per day.68 As of January 2015, over 7.7 million 
crowdfunders pledged more than $1 billion dollars to Kickstarter projects.69 
One of Kickstarter’s larger crowdfunded projects, “Pebble,” raised over $10 
million in 36 days.70 The largest Kickstarter project, “Coolest Cooler,” had 
62,642 backers (crowdfunders) and raised $13,285,226, despite listing a 
fundraising goal of $50,000.71 For reward crowdfunding, if the target goal is 
not reached, the crowdfunding websites will refund the money back to 
investors.72 Because reward crowdfunding does not involve sales or 
transfers of securities, reward crowdfunding websites currently operate 
without the SEC’s oversight.73 
One example of a start-up company’s ability to raise large amounts of 
capital through reward crowdfunding is Double Fine and 2 Player 
Productions. Double Fine and 2 Player Productions raised over $3 million 
                                                                                                                              
66 Wroldsen, supra note 60, at 588. 
67 Schwartz, supra note 52, at 47. 
68 The year in Kickstarter, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/year/2013/?ref 
=footer (last visited Apr. 17, 2014). 
69 Stats, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats?ref=footer (last visited 
Apr. 17, 2014). 
70 Pebble: E-Paper Watch for iPhone and Android, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstar 
ter.com/projects/597507018/pebble-e-paper-watch-for-iphone-and-android (last visited 
Apr. 17, 2014). 
71 Coolest Cooler: 21st Century Cooler That’s Actually Cooler, KICKSTARTER, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/ryangrepper/coolest-cooler-21st-century-cooler-
thats-actually?ref=most_funded (last visited Feb. 8, 2015). 
72 Mashburn, supra note 50, at 139. 
73 Id. at 130. 
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in one month from more than 87,000 individual crowdfunders for their 
game Double Fine Adventures.74 After its first eight hours, the 
crowdfunding campaign reached its target funding amount of $400,000 and 
surpassed $1 million in 24 hours.75 Crowdfunders were entitled to receive 
different rewards based on the amount they individually contributed to the 
campaign.76 
Pre-purchase crowdfunding is identical to reward crowdfunding, except 
that the reward is the item that is produced as a result of the crowdfunder’s 
contribution.77 The reward may be a copy of the video game or book that 
was created due to the crowdfunder’s contribution.78 This type of 
crowdfunding is also not subject to SEC regulations because it does not 
involve the sale of securities. 
Finally, in securities crowdfunding, investors receive a share in the 
profits or some type of security in the start-up.79 The security is an 
ownership interest in the company.80 As of March 2012, “three thousand 
investors pledged to invest $7.5 million when [unregistered] crowdfunding 
[securities] becomes legal.”81 Until the SEC promulgates rules governing 
securities crowdfunding under the Capital Raising Online While Deterring 
Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of 2012 (CROWDFUND Act), 
which will most likely be in October 2015, federal securities crowdfunding 
                                                                                                                              
74 Wroldsen, supra note 60, at 590. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 588. 
78 Id. 
79 Schwartz, supra note 52, at 48. 
80 Wroldsen, supra note 60, at 589. 
81 158 Cong. Rec. S2, 229–31 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 2012) (statement of Sen. Scott Brown). 
Social Purpose Corporations 947 
VOLUME 13 • ISSUE 3 • 2015 
is illegal.82 However, Washington and several other states have enacted 
security/equity crowdfunding statutes.83 
As a brief overview of the national act, in 2012, Congress enacted the 
CROWDFUND Act,84 which provides an exemption for crowdfunded 
securities to the Securities Act of 1933. The Securities Act of 1933 requires 
all securities to be registered with the SEC.85 However, crowdfunded 
securities up to a certain dollar amount, as discussed below, will be exempt 
from registration requirements. For the first time ever, ordinary Americans 
will have the ability to go online and invest up to a specific annual amount, 
dependent on their annual income, without having to deal with SEC 
regulations.86 The purpose of the CROWDFUND Act is to provide start-ups 
and small businesses access to a “big, new pool of potential investors-
namely the American people.”87 As a whole, the national Jumpstart Our 
Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) allows “private businesses to offer equity 
to anyone other than accredited investors in exchange for funding.”88 The 
Act’s two primary goals are (1) to create a low-cost method for small 
                                                                                                                              
82 Mashburn, supra note 50, at 130; Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 
REGINFO.GOV, (Jan. 3, 2015), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule? 
pubId=201410&RIN=3235-AL37. 
83 S.E.C.’s Delay on Crowdfunding May Just Save It, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2014,  
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/11/18/s-e-c-s-delay-on-crowdfunding-may-just-save-
it-2/?_r=0; Washington’s Jobs Act of 2014 (HB 2023) http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents 
/billdocs/2013-14/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/House/2023-S.SL.pdf.; Rules promulgated 
by the Washington State Department of Financial Institutions (DFI), the securities 
regulator for the state promulgated  rules,  can be found at: 
http://dfi.wa.gov/documents/rulemaking/securities/crowdfunding/proposed-language.pdf. 
84 The CROWDFUND Act is Title II of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS 
Act). H.R. 3606, 112th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2012). 
85 Schwartz, supra note 52, at 47. 




88 Kara Scharwath, Top 10 Crowdfunding Sites, TRIPLEPUNDIT: A MEDIA PLATFORM 
FOR THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE (July 16, 2012) http://www.triplepundit.com/2012/07/ 
emerging-next-generation-crowdfunding-platform-roundup/. 
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business owners and start-ups to raise up to $1 million per year from the 
public and (2) to allow investors of moderate means to make investments.89 
Although crowdfunding has funded and has the potential to fund many 
beneficial and successful projects, the North American Securities 
Administrators Association (NASAA) has placed crowdfunding fraud at the 
top of its 2012 list of investor threats.90 The internet has afforded fraudsters 
bountiful targets.91 The internet also makes it more difficult for investors to 
know whether a business is legitimate due to the lack of real-life 
encounters.92 In addition to listing non-existent projects or businesses, a real 
threat is fraudsters posing as registered funding portals.93 For example, by 
using domain names similar to legitimate crowdfunding intermediaries, 
fraudsters are able to trick novice investors into investing.94 Fraudsters may 
also indirectly solicit through spam e-mails and social media platforms such 
as Facebook and Twitter.95 Therefore, the impersonal nature of the internet 
calls for more investor protection.96 
A renowned rewards crowdfunding scam is “Dirty Bird Sports,” which 
sought funding for a new college football video game through Kickstarter 
by offering perks for investors such as dinner with Jamal Anderson (a 
former NFL running back), a chance to test-play the game, and signed 
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helmets from former Ohio State football players.97 The fraudsters stole 
images from 3D modeling artists and set a target fundraising goal of 
$500,000.98 In a short time, 13 investors contributed $685.99 The scam was 
discovered when Jamal Anderson was contacted, and he confirmed he had 
no knowledge of the project.100 If the fraud had not been discovered before 
the money was released to the fraudsters, Dirty Bird Sports could have 
gotten away with at least $500,000. 
As illustrated in this section, greenwashing practices and crowdfunding 
scams are occurring with increased frequency. Corporate fraudulent 
misrepresentations and vague environmentally friendly purposes perpetuate 
greenwashing practices, which negatively affect both consumers and 
investors. Although the FTC issued Green Guides as a standard for 
evaluating deceptive environmental marketing claims, it has no legal effect. 
Additionally, with reward crowdfunding, there are no SEC regulations that 
protect novel investors. Moreover, with the impersonal nature of the 
internet there is additional cause for concern about scams. 
PART II: SOCIAL PURPOSE CORPORATIONS 
Above, the article explored two ways in which contemporary marketing 
and funding sources have lent themselves to consumer abuse and fraud. 
This article will now explore an emerging entity that will be the next target 
of these scams—social purpose corporations. Below is a brief overview of 
social purpose corporations in relation to Washington State. 
While the primary objective of a traditional business corporation is 
to create economic value for its shareholders, the social purpose 
corporation now gives companies the latitude to also promote one 
or more broad goals of social responsibility, such as environmental 
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sustainability or committing to improve other aspects of the local, 
national, or world communities.101 
In 2012, after considerable deliberation, the Washington Corporate Act 
Revision Committee created the social purpose corporation, making a 
deliberate decision to draft a slightly different version of the benefit or 
hybrid corporation than that adopted by other states.102 Washington was the 
first state to have a social purpose corporation103 with only one other state 
following suit, Florida.104 Washington intended for the social purpose 
corporation statute to provide more flexibility to the socially responsible 
entrepreneurs than that which was afforded by the comparable benefit 
corporation statutes.105 The statute was not meant to legislate corporate 
behavior.106 Rather, each social purpose corporation would be able to 
determine what corporate behavior is applicable to it by stating its purpose 
in its articles of incorporation.107 In turn, the social purpose corporation’s 
board and officers may be permitted to attach weight to the corporation’s 
social purpose(s) in making business decisions and would not be held liable 
for doing so.108 The statute allows officers to make a corporate decision that 
foregoes the typical shareholder’s profit maximizing value in favor of one 
or more of the corporation’s social purposes as stated in the articles of 
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incorporation.109 In June 2012, the social purpose corporation became 
available as a legal business entity in Washington State.110 
As of December 1, 2014, there were 132 registered and 101 active social 
purpose corporations in Washington State, and that number is increasing 
weekly.111 A social purpose corporation must declare its intent to produce 
positive short-term or long-term effects or minimize adverse effects through 
its business activities.112 The effects may be “environmental or social, and 
can include the corporation’s employees, supply chain, customers, or the 
greater community, including local, state, national, or world.”113 
Additionally, a corporation may have more than one social purpose for 
which it is organized.114 
A corporation may incorporate as a social purpose corporation at any 
time.115 An existing corporation may become a social purpose corporation 
by approval of a two-thirds majority vote of stakeholders.116 A social 
purpose corporation may also choose to no longer be a social purpose 
corporation by a two-thirds majority vote.117 
PART III: WHY ARE SOCIAL PURPOSE CORPORATIONS THE NEXT 
TARGETS? 
After providing a brief overview of social purpose corporations above, 
this section will delve further into the flexible requirements and lack of 
investor protections under Washington’s social purpose corporation 
legislation. Specifically, the article will offer several reasons why social 
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purpose corporations are the next targets for greenwashing practices and 
crowdfunding scams. 
A. No Barriers to Entry and Flexible Requirements 
There are essentially no barriers of entry to form a social purpose 
corporation. The easy, flexible requirements that a corporation must fulfill 
to incorporate as a social purpose corporation will allow fraudsters to set up 
multiple social purpose corporations and utilize these corporations to attract 
investors. Social and green investors will not be as wary when investing in 
apparent social purpose corporations, so they are prone to invest in 
fraudsters posing as such. There is currently nothing in place to protect 
these investors. 
Only three requirements exist to incorporate a social purpose corporation: 
(1) the name of the corporation must include “social purpose corporation” 
or a version of SPC;118 (2) the articles of incorporation must state: “The 
mission of this social purpose corporation is not necessarily compatible 
with and may be contrary to maximizing profits and earnings for 
shareholders, or maximizing shareholder value in any sale, merger, 
acquisition or other similar actions of the corporation”; 119 and (3) a social 
purpose corporation must have at least one general social purpose.120 The 
corporation must “promote positive short-term or long-term effects of, or 
minimize adverse short-term or long-term effects of, the corporation’s 
activities upon any or all of (1) the corporation’s employees, suppliers, or 
customers; (2) the local, state, national or world community; or (3) the 
environment.”121 A social purpose corporation may, but is not required to, 
include a specific social purpose. If the corporation has designated a 
specific social purpose or purposes, this must be included in the articles of 
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incorporation.122 Besides the three requirements above, the only other step 
required to incorporate as a social purpose corporation is to pay $180 to 
register the company with the Washington State Secretary.123 
Additionally, the social purpose corporation legislation “seeks to impose 
accountability measures while maintaining a level of flexibility to serve the 
needs of each corporation.”124 The legislature maintains flexibility by 
requiring the social purpose corporation to post informal annual progress 
reports on its websites without any specific guidelines or requirements.125 
Also, the corporation is given the legal authority, but not obligation, to 
define its compliance with social objectives either by itself or through a 
third party.126 Unlike other jurisdictions that have similar benefit or hybrid 
corporations and mandate that the benefit or hybrid corporation utilize 
third-party standards to judge the corporation’s commitment to its social 
purposes, the Washington legislature decided not to include provisions in 
the social corporation legislation requiring shareholders to adopt third-party 
standards.127 Rather, the Washington legislature provided that the 
corporation may decide to assess the corporation’s performance with respect 
to its social purpose or purposes based on third-party standards.128 However, 
by providing such flexibility and essentially no mandatory accountability 
measures, the Washington legislature has effectively made social purpose 
corporations an easy target for greenwashing and crowdfunding scams. 
Also, because a social purpose corporation has flexibility in determining the 
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weight a social purpose may have on any of its business decisions, it may 
potentially place no weight on a social purpose while utilizing the valuable 
goodwill that is typically associated with a social purpose designation. 
B. Flexibility in Defining a Purpose 
Washington State specifically does not require the corporation’s officers 
and directors to consider stakeholders of the public and social benefit.129 
Rather, the directors and officers may take these considerations into account 
when making business decisions.130 The flexibility in defining the social 
purpose is advantageous to legitimate social purpose corporations, but also 
advantageous for greenwashing and crowdfunding fraudsters. 
A common form of greenwashing occurs when corporations release 
broad, high-minded environmental policy statements.131 For example, a 
corporation may make a general commitment to preserving the 
environment.132 Although the corporation does not identify specific 
commitments or objectives, a high-minded environmental policy generates 
good publicity and the corporation is not bound to produce measurable 
progress towards its policy.133 
An example of a corporation that marketed its broad environmental 
policy is British Petroleum (BP), whose environmental policy is to strive for 
"no accidents, no harm to people and no damage to the environment."134 
However, it is impossible for BP to do no damage to the environment when 
its business relies on extracting scarce natural resources.135 BP can continue 
                                                                                                                              
129 Peter J. Smith, Washington’s Social Purpose Corporation, THE APEX LAW GROUP 
LLP (2013), available at http://www.spcwa.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Washing 
tons_Social_Purpose_Corporation.pdf. 
130 Id. 
131 Vos, supra note 20, at 681. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Shanta Barley, BP Brings 'Green Era' to a Close, BBC NEWS (May 11, 2009), 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8040468.stm.  
135 Vos, supra note 20, at 681–82. 
Social Purpose Corporations 955 
VOLUME 13 • ISSUE 3 • 2015 
to work towards an impossible goal while ducking any allegations of 
perpetuating environmental problems by pointing to its noteworthy 
environmentally and socially beneficial goals and policies.136 Also, by being 
overly broad in its aspirations, there is no way for BP to be held liable for 
not following its environmental goals when its practices are generally not 
environmentally friendly. Similarly, fraudsters can create a social purpose 
corporation and attract investors with its broad purpose and may avoid 
liability from stakeholders or the general public. 
C. Lack of Available Information and Novice Investors 
In addition to the flexible requirements, social purpose corporations are 
not required to disclose any financial information to the public and 
investors.137 In fact, social purpose corporations are not required to possess 
audited financial statements and fraudsters could falsely produce such 
documents if requested or needed.138 Novice green or social investors may 
not be as suspicious or wary of companies that provide unaudited financial 
statements or that do not provide all the information that other more 
developed corporations may provide. This is partly due to the fact that it is 
normal for start-ups and small businesses to lack financial information 
related to their business. Start-ups face limited “human, informational, and 
financial resources.”139 Some suggest that “[m]any startups will not have 
done enough business to have generated sufficient financial information to 
disclose to potential investors.”140 
Of primary concern is that, through crowdfunding, any individual can 
invest in companies over the internet. Crowdfunding allows non-accredited 
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investors141 to invest in start-ups and small businesses.142 Also, given the 
multitude of online social network participants, online crowdfunding 
opportunities will likely attract many unsophisticated, non-accredited 
investors who may not be able to discern whether the listed project is a 
scam.143 If sophisticated investors fall victim to fraud, then unsophisticated 
investors need more protection and safeguards in place. Online 
crowdfunding exposes investors to unknown financial risks and higher 
incidents of fraud.144 Unsophisticated investors generally lack the necessary 
business or financial acumen to understand the risks involved with 
crowdfund investing or to understand in what they are investing.145 
There are several service providers that serve a risk-reduction function.146 
The providers, such as CrowdCheck, help investors make informed 
investments and avoid fraud by reviewing potential investments.147 
However, the cost for the services may exceed the amount to make it 
worthwhile for investors to invest. Since crowdfunding deals with smaller 
sums of money, expensive and detailed due diligence is not practical.148 
Investors will choose to donate in order to support the company’s noble 
goals without performing the extensive research typically done for 
investments. Crowdfunding investors will rely either on the issuer’s sales 
pitch or disclosed information.149 
For fraudsters posing as social purpose corporations, the only information 
that may be available to investors is any information that the fraudsters 
choose to reveal. Fraudsters may choose to disclose the annual report 
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publicly on the reward crowdfunding portal. Although the legislation 
requires that the annual report be publicly accessible at the corporation’s 
web site address, it only mandates that it must be furnished to the 
shareholders.150 
Nevertheless, the requirements for the annual report itself are broad, 
requiring only a “narrative discussion concerning the social purpose or 
purposes of the corporation, including the corporation’s efforts intended to 
promote its social purpose or purposes.”151 Fraudsters can easily draft an 
annual report to comport to this general narrative discussion requirement. 
Although social purpose corporations are required to provide a social 
purpose report, it is unhelpful without a way to verify the accuracy of the 
reports.152 Once again, the Washington legislature suggests, but does not 
require, information regarding the short- and long-term objectives of the 
corporation related to its social purpose(s), any prior or future corporate 
actions taken or expected to be taken to achieve the corporation’s social 
purpose(s), and any measures used by the corporation to evaluate its 
performance in achieving its social purpose(s).153 
D. Lack of Legal Recourse for Investors Under the Social Purpose 
Legislation 
Finally, in addition to the flexible requirements, there are no specific 
legal remedies available for investors under the current social purpose 
corporation legislation.154 However, a green investor who believes that they 
have been misled may bring a suit for fraud or misrepresentation. A 
crowdfund investor may also bring a suit for fraud against a scammer. 
Although some legal remedies are available to those who are defrauded, the 
financial obstacle may be too large of a hurdle for investors to overcome. 
                                                                                                                              
150 WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.25.150 (1) (2012). 
151 Id. 
152 Vos, supra note 20, at 689. 
153 WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.25.150 (2) (2012). 
154 WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.25.080 only provides legal remedies to shareholders. 
958 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
Because of the small dollar amounts in a crowdfunding offering, no 
single individual is likely to have made a large enough investment for 
litigation to be worthwhile.155 Investors may only recover up to the amount 
invested, which for small investors may amount to less than the cost of 
bringing suit in the first place.156 The limited dollar amount may lead to 
investors filing a class action suit to pool together the claims of investors.157 
However, the aggregate amount may still be too small to justify litigation 
costs. One study asserts that “smaller sized offerings hardly ever experience 
a securities-fraud lawsuit,” noting that less than 1 percent of offerings 
below $5 million resulted in a class action lawsuit.158 Another study noted 
that there must be at least $20 million in damages to “make the class action 
economically attractive to plaintiffs’ attorneys.”159 
Because there is a lack of legal recourse, and therefore no punishment for 
fraudulent behavior, fraudsters are effectively encouraged to continue to 
scam investors. 
PART IV: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
This article would like to suggest several solutions below that the 
Washington State Legislature should consider in order to protect investors. 
A. Require Standardized Benchmarks and Third-Party Evaluations 
The Washington legislature should amend the social purpose annual 
report section of the legislation to require that all social purpose 
corporations identify standard benchmarks and/or accreditation typically 
used in the field or industry to evaluate the corporations’ actions in 
furthering their social purposes. There should also be evaluations as to how 
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the corporations’ prior and future actions towards achieving social purposes 
align with the benchmarks. Specifically, there should be at least one third-
party evaluation of the corporations’ progress towards their social purposes 
with the results made public to the investors. 
It will be more difficult for fraudsters to falsely create a social purpose 
report if there is a certain standard or accreditation that needs to be used or 
obtained. Additionally, by requiring legitimized reports, the proposed 
legislative change will help investors become better informed. One scholar 
proposed, “[t]he growing wisdom is that companies must produce verified 
accountability reports—verified reports by auditors specializing in social 
accounting and auditing.”160 
Several suggestions as to what a good environmental report should 
contain have emerged in attempts to address greenwashing practices. 
Particular to addressing greenwashing practices, there have been several 
suggestions as to what a good environmental report should contain. For 
example, a good environmental report should discuss a company’s footprint 
using quantitative metrics and cover the central environmental issues such 
as air emissions, water pollution, hazardous waste disposal, energy 
consumption, greenhouse gas emissions, and notices of legal violations.161 
The FTC’s Green Guides might be acceptable benchmarks to evaluate 
social purpose corporations that have environmental friendly purposes. The 
absence of any required benchmark for a good environmental report could 
undermine social purpose corporations’ legitimacy, so any benchmark 
provided by the Washington State Legislature will be an improvement. As 
one article states, “If for no other reason, with accusations of greenwashing 
and evidence of its practice, decisions to . . . forgo the requirement entirely 
strongly undermine an appearance of legitimacy.”162 
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Additionally, the Washington State Legislature could use third-party 
standards similar to those used to evaluate benefit corporations in other 
states and through B-Lab.163 B-Lab is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization 
that supports and certifies benefit corporations.164 Benefit corporation 
legislation does not determine what third-party standard is acceptable and 
appropriate and does not require the benefit corporations to adopt a specific 
third-party standard.165 Rather, there are certain minimum requirements that 
the third-party standards must meet.166 These include requirements that the 
report must be comprehensive, prepared independently of the benefit 
corporation, credible, and transparent.167 
Currently, the goal of preserving a social purpose corporation’s flexibility 
has left the social purpose report legislation too broad, requiring only that 
the “narrative discussion may include the following information. . . . ”168 
The legislation does provide some optional suggestions about what may be 
included in the social report, but leaves the decision about what to include 
in the report to the social purpose corporations themselves.169 Even if 
Washington State’s legislature provides some universal minimum 
requirement for the social purpose report, by not requiring a particular 
standard, the legislature can continue to provide flexibility to social purpose 
corporations. 
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Arguably, by requiring third-party accountability, legitimate 
entrepreneurs will not have the ability to personally decide whether they 
have met the social goals they have set for themselves. Accordingly, it is 
also hard to measure impact. However, by allowing corporations to pick the 
third-party standard that would be most appropriate to evaluate their 
activities, entrepreneurs can pick how they would like to measure their 
social impact. The entrepreneur can also determine that it may be more 
appropriate to utilize a combination of standards. Therefore, a requirement 
that social purpose reports be accountable to third-party standards will not 
negatively affect legitimate social purpose corporations. 
Another argument that may emerge is that it may be too burdensome for 
corporations to follow the extra benchmarks. However, other states have 
created benchmarks and requirements that exceed the suggested benchmark 
above and these standards have not deterred the creation of hybrid or benefit 
corporations.170 
B. Hold Crowdfunding Portal Websites Liable and Require Minimum 
Disclosures on the Websites 
In addition to revising legislation, crowdfunding portal websites should 
be held liable for fraudulent activity or at least be required to take certain 
precautions to minimize fraud. 
In the earlier mentioned scams, Dirty Bird Sports and Kobe Red, it was 
not Kickstarter, the crowdfunding portal site, that discovered the projects 
were a scam. Rather, in the Dirty Bird Sports case, Kickstarter suspended 
the project only when someone contacted Jamal Anderson and he confirmed 
he had no knowledge of the project.171 Additionally, in Kobe Red, Los 
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Angeles-based filmmakers who were conducting research for their 
documentary film, Kickstarted, discovered the scam.172 The filmmakers 
wanted to highlight successful crowdfunding projects and contacted 
Magnus Fun, Inc., Kobe Red’s founders, through the “Contact Me” link on 
its Kickstarter website.173 Several correspondences were exchanged 
between the filmmakers and Magnus Fun, Inc., and after several suspicious 
comments and announcements, the filmmakers hired a private investigator 
to look into the company.174 The filmmakers published their findings on a 
social networking site, and showed among other things that: (1) the 
company was not registered in California as stated on Magnus Fun, Inc.’s 
Kickstarter website; (2) the email used to register Magnus Fun, Inc., with 
Kickstarter was the same as the one used to register another website—
Uhadme.com—which was removed; and (3) none of the taste testimonials 
provided on Magnus Fun, Inc.’s Kickstarter website could be verified.175 
Kickstarter’s essential avoidance of liability by stating in its FAQ section 
that funders (investors) are responsible for evaluating projects’ legitimacy is 
even more concerning.176 If something seems strange, it is up to the 
crowdfunders to submit a fraud report.177 
In the case of Kobe Red, ordinary filmmakers were able to discover red-
flag issues by performing minimal checks on the company’s name. This 
would not be unduly burdensome for the crowdfunding websites. It should 
not be up to the watchdog group or investors who have been scammed to 
discover the scam. Instead, the duty should be placed on the crowdfund 
websites to vet the social purpose corporations that may be scams before 
they are placed on the website. A crowdfunding site may argue that it 
should not be expected to undertake the due diligence necessary to vet all 
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the projects listed on its site. Crowdfunding sites may argue that the 
crowdfunding portals may eventually have millions of projects, and even 
minimal checks may become unduly burdensome. However, because the 
websites receive compensation for promoting the fraudulent organizations, 
they should at least verify they are promoting legitimate investment 
opportunities. 
Under the JOBS Act, security/equity crowdfunding portals are held 
accountable and are “subject to rigorous oversight” by the SEC.178 The 
JOBS Act mandates that these specific crowdfunding portals need to 
“screen issuers, educate investors, and track investor income levels.”179 This 
mandate is only for security/equity crowdfunding portals and the reward 
and security/equity crowdfunding portals are different portals. However, 
because reward and securities crowdfunding portals list funding projects 
and collect and distribute the crowdfunded money, the legislature should 
consider treating both portals in a similar manner. The policy underlying 
this provision of the JOBS Act seems applicable to the reward 
crowdfunding portals as well: crowdfunding portals should be held liable 
because they are repeat players that can handle regulation and can 
accordingly spread the cost.180 Just as fear and awareness of the high 
possibility of fraud for securities crowdfunding motivated Congress to pass 
the JOBS Act, these same concerns should compel the Washington 
legislature or even Congress to consider regulation overseeing reward 
crowdfunding websites. 
This article is not suggesting that a crowdfunding site should have a 
fiduciary duty or strict liability. If the standard is strict liability, it would be 
too expensive for the crowdfunding websites to operate and may discourage 
them from operating or cause them to increase the percentage they obtain 
from the listed projects. This standard potentially would discourage 
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legitimate projects from listing their projects on the websites. The point of 
crowdfunding is to provide start-ups and entrepreneurs a less expensive 
option to obtain capital. This article is also not suggesting that 
crowdfunding websites should have no liability. However, there should be a 
responsibility for crowdfunding websites to take actions to reduce the risk 
of fraud. Once again, the JOBS Act’s treatment of crowdfunding portals is a 
reasonable guideline and framework for legislatures to utilize when creating 
liability for crowdfunding portals. 
Under the JOBS Act, crowdfunding portals are required to “take such 
measures to reduce the risk of fraud . . . including obtaining a background 
and securities enforcement regulatory history check on each officer, 
director, and person holding more than 20 percent of the outstanding equity 
of every issuer whose securities are offered by such person.”181  
Crowdfunding portals are required to register and provide disclosures to 
educate the investors.182 Also, these portals must ensure that each investor 
(1) reviews the investment education information, (2) positively affirms that 
he or she understands that she or he could lose his or her entire investment, 
and (3) answers questions demonstrating that he or she understands the risks 
of speculative investments.183 Finally, crowdfunding portals must act 
reasonably and in good faith when fulfilling their obligations.184 Although 
obtaining a background and “securities enforcement regulatory history 
check” may seem too much for reward crowdfunding websites to take on, it 
is reasonable to require that reward crowdfunding portals act reasonably and 
act in good faith when listing projects on their crowdfunding sites. 
There is a chance that crowdfunding sites may attract investors by stating 
that they have vetted the projects before listing them on their portals. But it 
will most likely never happen with the free market approach. Although a 
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crowdfunding portal may attract investors by stating that it has vetted the 
projects before listing them on its portal, there will be a limit to the amount 
of liability the portal would be willing to undertake for listing 
misrepresentations or fraudulent opportunities. 
Environmental regulation is a prime example of an instance where 
private market pressures are not helpful in bringing about an 
optimum balance between current needs and the protection of 
future resources. The market can be helped along by environmental 
legislation if the legislation turns over the right information to the 
market.185 
Thus, the Washington State Legislature or Congress should create 
universal regulations that hold online crowdfunding portals responsible for 
the scams perpetrated on their portals because crowdfunding portals should 
be held liable to the investors whom they attract to their websites. 
Along with requiring the reward crowdfunding websites to act reasonably 
and in good faith in listing the projects on their sites, the state legislature 
should require crowdfunding websites to provide additional disclosures to 
those who wish to invest in the crowdfunding projects. Merely alerting the 
“crowd” that there may be some risks is insufficient. Most unsophisticated 
investors are unlikely to read or take notice of required disclosures, 
especially since prior history has shown that most readers ignore online 
disclosures such as terms of service.186 The state should protect investors 
and maintain market integrity. State authorities retain jurisdiction over 
issuers or intermediaries in relation to fraud, deceit, or unlawful conduct.187 
Mandatory disclosure of information, including the risks of a particular 
investment, protects investors and is designed to provide investors access to 
information.188 The CROWDFUND Act expressly preempts additional 
regulations from states regarding registration or qualification of securities 
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and crowdfunding offerings, issuers, or intermediaries before the securities 
may be sold.189 However, because reward crowdfunding does not deal with 
securities, there is no regulation that prevents states from creating additional 
regulations. 
Previously, Kickstarter only required that the project list the creator’s 
company.190 After May 19, 2014, Kickstarter does list a verified name in the 
creator-bio section.191 However, it is not clear from Kickstarter’s website 
what process was taken in order to verify the name. Rather, the website only 
states that the creator’s identity was verified through an automated 
process.192 Although Kickstarter recently amended its policies, other 
websites do not provide a verified name. This makes it extremely easy for 
scam artists to use the name of the social purpose corporation itself to tug 
on an investor’s moral conscience to invest in their scams. Furthermore, by 
including a broad social or green purpose, the fraudsters will be able to 
scam unsophisticated investors who are attracted to those specific purposes. 
While there should be additional disclosures on the crowdfunding 
websites, the SEC should not require as many of the disclosures as are 
required under the JOBS Act because reward crowdfunding does not relate 
to security/equity investments. Under the Act, Congress requires 
crowdfunding issuers to file a disclosure document to the SEC, 
intermediaries (including crowdfunding portals), and potential investors, 
which includes the following nine mandatory disclosures: 
(1) the issuer’s name, legal status, physical address, and website 
address; (2) the names of the directors, officers, and shareholders 
with more than 20% ownership interest; (3) a description of the 
issuer’s business and anticipated business plan; (4) a description of 
the issuer’s financial condition; (5) a description of the stated 
purpose and intended use of the proceeds of the offering; (6) the 
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target offering amount and deadline to reach the target amount; (7) 
the price to the public of the securities or the method for 
determining the price; (8) a description of the issuer’s ownership 
and capital structure; and (9) any other information the SEC may 
require to protect investors.193 
Additionally, before issuing securities, issuers are required to file 
disclosure documents with the SEC and make them available to possible 
investors.194 The disclosure requirements differ depending on the amount of 
capital required by the offering. Offerings of $100,000 or less require that 
issuers disclose income tax returns for the last fiscal year and unaudited 
financial statements certified as accurate by the principal executive 
officer.195 Offerings between $100,000 and $500,000 require financial 
statements reviewed by an independent public accountant, and offerings 
between $500,000 and the maximum $1 million require audited financial 
statements.196 Following a crowdfunding round, an issuer must file financial 
statements and a report on the results of the operation with the SEC and 
investors.197 
This article suggests that additional disclosures should include, at 
minimum, the following: (1) the project creator’s name, legal status, 
physical address, and website address; (2) a description of the issuer’s 
business and anticipated business plan; (3) a description of the stated 
purpose and intended use of the proceeds of the offering; (4) the target 
offering amount and deadline to reach the target amount; and (5) the annual 
social purpose report198 if it is a social purpose corporation. The suggested 
disclosures align with a few of the requirements listed above in the JOBS 
Act. Although some may argue that the additional disclosures may be too 
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burdensome for the flexible structure of legitimate social purpose 
corporations, corporations that seek security crowdfunding would need to 
meet the even stricter JOBS Act disclosure requirements. Even if they are 
not receiving a security interest, because they are obtaining funds, they 
should be able to meet at least the above suggested requirements. 
Building confidence in the crowdfunding websites will allow investors to 
invest with confidence. Similar to the Crowdfunding Accreditation for 
Platform Standards for funding portals, there should be a similar 
accreditation program to regulate reward crowdfunding websites. 
Accreditation would be a “gatekeeper.” 
One issue is that the crowdfunding websites have two masters: both the 
issuers (who may be fraudsters) and investors. The websites do not 
exclusively serve investor interests, similar to funding portals that may be 
retained and compensated by issuers and also owe duties to both the issuers 
and investors.199 However, crowdfunding websites should have more of a 
duty to investors in order to ensure investor protection. Therefore, it should 
be clear that the crowdfunding websites should serve to protect the 
investors. Additionally, an investor may not be able to recover damages as 
the fraudsters may be insolvent.200 The reward crowdfunding websites 
should have some liability, and investors should be allowed to go after these 
websites to recover their losses if the fraudsters are insolvent. 
C. Limit Crowdfunding Investments in Reward Crowdfunding Similar to 
Security Crowdfunding 
Another solution, in addition to legislative revision and liability for 
crowdfunding websites, is to limit the amount of money an investor can 
invest through reward crowdfunding websites. Congress included a strict 
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annual cap on the aggregate amount that a person may invest in 
crowdfunded securities.201 For an investor with a net worth or annual salary 
below $100,000, the annual cap would be the greater of 5 percent of the 
investor’s annual income or $2,000.202 If an investor’s net worth or annual 
salary is over $100,000, the annual cap is 10 percent of her or his annual 
salary, up to a maximum of $100,000.203 Intermediaries may only release 
the proceeds to an issuer when the aggregate capital meets or exceeds the 
target amount.204 Intermediaries are required to ensure that no investor has 
purchased crowdfund securities beyond their annual cap.205 
The idea behind the annual investment cap was to ensure that the 
investor’s loss would be affordable, ensuring that the investor would not 
lose his or her life savings. This cap should also apply to investors who 
wish to invest in reward crowdfunding projects in order to ensure that the 
investor will not lose her or his life savings. By creating this cap, people 
investing in the fraudulent social purpose corporations will not be 
substantially hurt beyond what they can endure. 
D. Hold Fraudulent Issuers Accountable for Plaintiff’s Attorney Fees 
Finally, attorneys’ fees should be awarded to victims of fraud. Fraudulent 
issuers should be held accountable for plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees in order to 
provide an economic incentive for attorneys to litigate. “Plaintiffs’ attorneys 
must incur the up-front expenses of litigation in hopes of securing an award 
that offsets the cost of litigation, while these attorneys can hope to recover 
30% of the award.”206 Therefore, Washington State’s legislature should 
provide regulation that the fraudulent issuers be held accountable for 
plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees, after it is determined that the investments were 
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obtained through fraudulent measures. This would provide an economic 
incentive for attorneys to litigate a class action suit. Additionally, this may 
also deter fraudulent issuers because they will have more to lose than just 
returning the funds that were raised, especially if the investment amounts 
are minimal. 207 
CONCLUSION 
Green corporations are important to maintain environment sustainability. 
As one source stated, “Truthful advertising about goods and services is an 
unequivocal social good. It reduces uncertainty and improves the quality of 
decision-making. It facilitates search, promotes competition, and increases 
the likelihood of consumer satisfaction.”208 
Furthermore, crowdfunding is a new way for small businesses and 
entrepreneurs to obtain capital, bypassing the traditional venture capital 
route. It also allows small businesses to bypass the heavy legal, regulatory, 
and practical costs of issuing registered securities.209 This fuels the 
entrepreneurial investments and has potential for a huge impact. As 
President Obama remarked, these entrepreneurial ventures are critical to 
spurring the country’s economic growth.210 
Finally, companies have seriously considered corporate social 
responsibility when examining their reputations to consumers and the public 
due to social media. Overall, consumers have increasingly expected and 
focused on social responsibility by companies. In order to allow 
corporations the flexibility to incorporate social purpose into corporate 
values, state legislatures are recognizing a need to define a new hybrid 
entity for for-profit corporations that want to promote one or more social 
purposes. In the last two to three years and in increasing frequency, other 
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states are adopting similar legislation to allow social entrepreneurs to 
incorporate one or more social purposes into their companies’ missions. 
However, if fraud is synonymous with social purpose corporation, society 
as a whole will be ultimately hurt as legitimate social purpose corporations 
have the potential to benefit society’s welfare. The idea of social purpose 
corporations may inherit an unfavorable reputation and ultimately stagnate 
the start-up market. Therefore, the Washington State Legislature will need 
to add and amend current legislation in order to protect the investors. The 
legislature should try to prevent fraud upfront rather than waiting for this to 
become a substantial issue. Once Washington State’s legislature takes 
preemptive steps to prevent fraud, other states may follow in protecting 
their for-profit hybrid entities. 
